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NOTES
THE TRUST CORPORATION: DUAL FIDUCIARY
DUTIES AND THE CONFLICT OF INSTITUTIONS
INTRODUCTION
It is sometimes the desire of a testator to employ shares representing
a controlling interest I in a corporation as income-producing properties of a
trust.2 To accomplish this, he may direct that control of the corporation
be exercised by the trustee as a director, with the voting power of
the trust shares being used for self-election.3 In such a context there arises
a duality of fiduciary duties in the same individual. Although the legal
rules surrounding both positions contain prohibitions against conflict of
interests,4 this particular situation--often considered desirable for purposes
of trust administration-is usually permitted to exist.5 In 1937 lEdmond
N. Cahn, writing in this Review, stated that "in such case, it remains the
duty of the trustee-director to adhere to that standard of conservatism and
prudence which the interests of his trust demands." 6
1The trust-itself or combined with the individual holdings of the fiduciary-
may own all or a majority of the voting shares of the corporate stock, or may, through
dispersal of the shares, have working control without an actual majority. In formu-
lating the rules which determine fiduciary responsibility, some courts and commen-
tators have in the past drawn distinctions based on degree of control. See In the
Matter of Estate of Adler, 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1937);
In the Matter of Estate of McLaughlin, 164 Misc. 539, 299 N.Y. Supp. 559 (Surr.
Ct. 1937); Moll & Silverman, Closed Corporations and Some Related Problems of
the Fiduciary, 19 N.Y. CERTIFiED PuBLIC AccOUNTANT 609 (1949); Note, Trusts
-The Fiduciary Aspects of Estate Corporatims, 57 MicH. L. REv. 738 (1959).
However, it is submitted that such differences are not material; the outside interests
appearing in varying degrees in each of these situations require application of a
consistent principle for their protection.
2While the term "trust corporation" is used herein, no distinction is intended
from a corporation the shares of which are held by a fiduciarylas part of an estate
rather than an express trust; such a distinction is not material. See 3 BOGEmRT, TRUSTS
& TRUSTEES § 572, at 514 (1946): "A personal representative who properly carries
on the business of a decedent . . . for the purpose of profit over a definite or
indefinite period, is a trustee; and this is true whether or not he be given this desig-
nation. It is irrelevant whether by his original appointment he was executor or
testamentary trustee under a will, or an administrator appointed by the court. It is
the substance of his duties, and not the name given him in the will, or by the court
from which he derived his power, that is determinative."
3 See, e.g., Rosencrans v. Fry, 21 N.J. Super. 289, 91 A.2d 162 (Ch. 1952), aff'd,
12 N.J. 88, 95 A.2d 905 (1953); In the Matter of Estate of Doelger, 164 Misc. 590,
299 N.Y. Supp. 565 (Surr. Ct. 1937), rev'd, 254 App. Div. 178, 4 N.Y.S.2d 334,
aff'd per curiam, 279 N.Y. 646, 18 N.E.2d 42 (1938) ; Green v. Philadelphia Inquirer
Co., 329 Pa. 169, 196 Atl. 32 (1938).
4 See notes 8-28 infra and accompanying text.
5 See 2 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 193.2 (2d ed. 1956).
6 Calm, Estate Corporations, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 136, 138 (1937).
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It is the purpose of this Note to determine whether Cahn's view
continues to be correct as a proposition of law or desirable as a matter of
policy. The area of conflict and the possible resolutions thereof will be
analyzed. The validity of the dual fiduciary status, however, will be
presumed; the propriety of both fiduciary duties co-existing in the same
individual has been condoned. While the interests of the life tenant
and the remainderman will be recognized, the major portion of the discus-
sion will focus on the interests of corporate creditors and shareholders other
than the trust; such interests have been given little consideration in previ-




Foremost of the duties owed by a trustee is that of loyalty-the obliga-
tion to act solely in the best interests of the beneficiaries.8 This duty in-
hibits 9 or prohibits 10 action of the fiduciary in a conflict-of-interests situa-
tion.1 ' While there are well-defined areas of conflict, situations on the
peripheries of those areas require the sound discretion of a court of equity
to determine at the outset whether the threat to the beneficial interests is
of sufficient moment to require intervention.12 When a conflict is found
to exist, imposition of the duty is made on two levels.
Where the settlor has expressly 13 or by implication 14 authorized
action in a conflict situation or where the beneficiaries have acquiesced
7 See, e.g., Note, mpra note 1.
8 See generally 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES §§ 484-93, 543-44, 612 (1946);
2 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 170-.25 (2d ed. 1956); 4 id. §§ 497-506; Scott, The Trustee's
Duty of Loyalty, 49 HARV. L. Rrv. 521 (1936).
9 See notes 13-15 infra and accompanying text.
10 See notes 17-19 infra and accompanying text.
11 In addition to common-law requirements, the statutes of some states restrict
self-dealing of fiduciaries. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2229-30; N.Y. PEas. PROP.
LAws § 21(2); TEX. PROB. CODE § 352 (1956).
12 See Ingalls v. Ingalls, 257 Ala. 521, 59 So. 2d 898 (1952) ; Estate of Guzzetta,
97 Cal. App. 2d 169, 217 P.2d 460 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950) ; Whiting v. Bryant, 102
Ohio App. 508, 131 N.E.2d 425 (1956); Manchester v. Cleveland Trust Co., 95 Ohio
App. 201, 114 N.E.2d 242 (1953). Compare In the Matter of Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246,
97 N.E,2d 888 (1951), with Estate of Keyston, 102 Cal. App. 2d 223, 227 P.2d 17
(Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
13 In the Matter of Estate of Schuster, 35 Ariz. 457, 281 Pac. 38 (1929) ; Newton
v. Old-Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 299 Mich. 499, 300 N.W. 859 (1941);
Finley v. Exchange Trust Co., 183 Okla. 167, 80 P.2d 296 (1938). In the particular
context of the trustee-director, see Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N.E. 647
(1930); Rosencrans v. Fry, 21 N.J. Super. 289, 91 A.2d 162 (Ch. 1952), aff'd, 12
N.J. 88, 95 A.2d 905 (1953); In the Matter of Estate of Doelger, 254 App. Div. 178,
4 N.Y.S.2d 334, aff'd per curiarn, 279 N.Y. 646, 18 N.E.2d 42 (1938). But see
UNIFORM TRUSTS ACT § 17.
14 Martin v. Martin, 249 S.W.2d 542 (Ky. 1952); Robertson v. Hert's Adm'rs
312 Ky. 405, 227 S.W.2d 899 (1950); see Steele Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 103 A.2d 409
(1954) (trustee-director); Flagg Estate, 365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411 (1950) (trustee-
director).
THE TRUST CORPORATION
therein,'5 a transaction will be upheld only if the trustee can demonstrate
that the dealing was in good faith and was fair and reasonable in all re-
spects.16 However, the merits of the transaction are not reached when
neither the settlor nor the beneficiaries have consented.17 In such a case,
self-dealing is flatly prohibited.' 8 The application of this "no further in-
quiry" rule makes voidable by the beneficiaries any transaction involving
a conflict of interests if prior authorization has not been given. 19 Should
the trustee act improperly in either circumstance, he will bear the risk of
loss 20 to the trust and be held accountable for profits.2 '
The duty of loyalty of the corporate director is also clearly estab-
lished 22 and has been said to be analogous to that of trustee to beneficiary2
The tests of fairness and no further inquiry are found also in the corporate
15 Malone's Guardian v. Malone, 255 Ky. 210, 73 S.W.2d 38 (1934); Schockett
v. Tublin, 170 Md. 117, 183 At. 521 (1936) ; Alburger v. Crane, 5 N.J. 573, 76 A.2d
812 (1950); Ungrich v. Ungrich, 141 App. Div. 485, 126 N.Y. Supp. 419 (1910),
aff'd inem., 207 N.Y. 662, 100 N.E. 1134 (1912) ; see 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTmS
§ 484 (1946) ; 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 170 (2d ed. 1956) ; cf. Ryan v. Plath, 20 Wash. 2d
663, 148 P.2d 946 (1944).
16 See authorities cited notes 13-15 supra.
17 See Schultz v. O'Heam, 319 Ill. 244, 149 N.E. 808 (1925) ; Meade v. Vande
Voorde, 139 Neb. 827, 299 N.W. 175 (1941) ; 3 BOGaERT, TRusTs & TRUSTEES § 484,
at 99-100 (1946) ; Haggerty, Conflicting Interests of Estate Fiduciaries in New York
and the "No Further Inquiry" Ride, 18 FoRDHAm L. REV. 1 (1949); cf. Taussig v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 171 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1948) ; Bowles v. Bowles, 141 Va.
35, 42, 126 S.E. 49, 51 (1925) (dictum).
18 "In this conflict of interests, the law wisely interposes. It acts not on the
possibility, that, in some cases, the sense of that duty may prevail over the motives
of self-interest, but it provides against the probability in many cases, and the danger
in all cases, that the dictates of self-interest will exercise a predominant influence,
and supersede that of duty. It therefore prohibits a party from purchasing on his
own account that which his duty or trust requires him to sell on account of another
." Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 502, 554-55 (1846). Accord, Schultz
v. O'Hearn, 319 Ill. 244, 149 N.E. 808 (1925); In. re Trusteeship Under Will of
Riordan, 216 Iowa 1138, 248 N.W. 21 (1933); St. Paul Trust Co. v. Strong, 85
Minn. 1, 88 N.W. 256 (1901); Marcellus v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 291 N.Y.
372, 52 N.E.2d 907 (1943) ; see Haggerty, supra note 17.
19 Schultz v. O'Hearn, 319 Ill. 244, 149 N.E. 808 (1925) ; Meade v. Vande Voorde,
139 Neb. 827, 299 N.W. 175 (1941) ; Alburger v. Crane, 5 N.J. 573, 577-78, 76 A.2d
812, 814 (1950) (dictum); Tiffany v. Clark, 58 N.Y. 632, 633 (1874) (dictum);
cf. Taussig v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 171 F.2d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 1948) (dictum) ;
3 BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 484 (1946).
20 In the Matter of Estate of Westhall, 125 N.J. Eq. 551, 5 A.2d 757 (Ct Err.
& App. 1939) ; In the Matter of Auditore, 249 N.Y. 335, 164 N.E. 242 (1928) ; Hayes
v. Hall, 188 Mass. 510, 512, 74 N.E. 935, 937 (1905) (dictum); see 2 Scor, TRUSTS
§ 170.25 (2d ed. 1956).
2 l Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106 (1914) ; Vincent v. Weruer, 140 Kan. 599,
38 P.2d 687 (1934) ; Clay v. Thomas, 178 Ky. 199, 198 S.W. 762 (1917) ; Calaveras
Timber Co. v. Michigan Trust Co., 278 Mich. 445, 270 N.W. 743 (1936) ; see 2 ScoTT,
TRUSTS § 170.25 (2d ed. 1956).
22 See generally 3 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §9 838-988 (perm. ed. rev.
repl. 1947) ; 1 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE §§ 431-51 (1959) ; 2 OLECK,
MODEM CORPORATION LAW § 972-95 (1959). The statutes of several states have
provisions indicating the conditions upon which self-dealing by directors will be per-
mitted. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §820; MICH. ComP. LAWS § 450.13(5) (1948);
RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-4-7 (1956).
23 See 3 FrmcER, op. cit. mtpra note 22, § 838; 2 OLECE, op. cit. supra note 22,
§ 972; Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1931).
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area; 2 however, the choice of the applicable rule is here influenced by the
collegiate nature of the directorate. It may be that the interested director
has in no way participated in the board decision which works to his own
advantage. If he joins in the directorial action, it may be that his par-
ticipation was necessary to constitute a quorum or to gain approval of the
transaction; on the other hand, it is possible that his presence, or vote, or
both, were superfluous.25 A minority of courts apply a test of fairness
in each of the above instances, thus preventing the existence of self-dealing
per se from destroying a transaction otherwise beneficial to the corpora-
tion.2 6 Others have imposed the strict rule, which makes voidable by the
corporation any self-dealing transaction.27  The majority of jurisdictions
will apply the per se rule in cases where the interested director's participa-
tion was necessary to the result; the fairness criterion is used when he did
not take part or when his contribution was unneeded.
28
The rules in the two areas have much in common. In both, the es-
sence of the duty of loyalty is fairness. In both, the question of fairness
usually will not be reached unless special circumstances exist which place
the conflict of interest beyond the absolute prohibition rule-in the case of
a trustee, express or implied authorization from the settlor or the bene-
ficiaries; in the case of a director, something similar to authorization
through the approval of a more-than-sufficient number of disinterested
directors.
The Broader Implications of the Duty
Self-dealing of either director or trustee is but one, albeit the primary,
aspect of the application of the duty. But as a basic obligation of the
fiduciary to act solely in the interests of those beneficially involved, the
duty may be violated also by advancing the interests of a third party in
preference to those to whom the duty is owed.2 9  Thus, as to the trustee
24 See authorities cited notes 26-28 infra.
25 See 2 OLEcK, op. cit. supra note 22, § 972.
26 See, e.g., Ransome Concrete Mach. Co. v. Moody, 282 Fed. 29 (2d Cir. 1922);
Wyman v. Bowman, 127 Fed. 257 (8th Cir. 1904); Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v.
Peteler Car Co., 132 Minn. 277, 156 N.W. 255 (1916); Savage v. Madelia Farmers'
Warehouse Co., 98 Minn. 343, 108 N.W. 296 (1906) ; Jordan v. Jordan Co., 94 Conn.
384, 393, 109 Ati. 181, 184 (1920) (dictum); Nicholson v. Kingery, 37 Wyo. 299,
302, 261 Pac. 122, 124 (1927) (dictum) ; cf. Note, 61 HARV. L. Rxv. 335 (1948).
27 See, e.g., Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. 539, 63 Pac. 416 (1900); Pearson v.
Concord R.R., 62 N.H. 537, 13 Am. St. Rep. 590 (1883); Munson v. Syracuse, G.
& C.R.R., 103 N.Y. 59, 8 N.E. 355 (1886); cf. Clapp v. Wallace, 221 Iowa 672, 266
N.W. 493 (1936); Cuthbert v. McNeill, 103 N.J. Eq. 199, 200, 142 Ati. 819, 820
(Ch. 1928) (dictum). The force of the Munson case seems to have been reduced
in New York by the language of Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d
18 (1942) ; see Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 48 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd
Per curiam, 152 F.2d 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 845 (1946).
28 See, e.g., Cook v. Malvern Brick & Tile Co., 194 Ark. 759, 109 S.W.2d 451
,(1937); Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Carson, 151 Ill. 444, 38 N.E. 140 (1894);
Chilton v. Bell County Coke & Improvement Co., 153 Ky. 775, 156 S.W. 889 (1913) ;
Nye v. Storer, 168 Mass. 53, 46 N.E. 402 (1897). Compare Ft. Payne Rolling Mill
A.. Hill, 174 Mass. 224, 54 N.E. 532 (1899), with Nye v. Storer, supra.
29 Cf. 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 543, at 375-76 (1946).
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or director the duty of loyalty in the narrow sense would appear an im-
portant but limited restriction on activity in favor of self; in the broader
sense, where the two institutions are joined by a common fiduciary, any
exercise of discretion in one capacity may be considered as not in the best
interests of the other institution and therefore a breach of the duty. This
broader problem goes to the heart of the determination of the rules to be
applied to transactions between the corporation and the trust, and to the
exercise of discretion in each capacity.
Transactions
The situation in which the trustee-director finds himself is one where
control over the activities of two institutions, exercised in a fiduciary
capacity, rests in the same hands. The same may be said of two corpora-
tions controlled by interlocking directorates. For this reason the treatment
by the courts of transactions between such corporations would seem to
provide a particularly useful analogy in the present problem.30
Older cases held that any transaction between corporations having
common directors was voidable at will by either corporation.31 Although
some courts may still apply this rule-particularly when the same persons
constitute a majority of both boards 3 -most jurisdictions now hold that
the corporation wishing the benefit of the contract may prevent avoidance
by sustaining the burden of proving that the transaction was fair and rea-
sonable.33 In some cases the courts have gone so far as to place the burden
of showing unfairness upon the proponent of avoidance.34 Regardless of
the rule to be applied, the ratification of the transaction by the share-
holders is usually held to cure the defect.35
A similar treatment of the trust-corporation transaction would permit
either institution to avoid an agreement in which a fiduciary has dealt on
both sides, if the other cannot sustain the proof of fairness. In this way
the beneficial interests of each will be protected: neither is subordinated to
the other, and both may obtain the benefit of a fair contract. A departure
from the rule would, in the intracorporate aspect, prefer one group of share-
holders over another. More stringent protection for the trust would injure
the remaining shareholders, while any preference to the corporation would
benefit independent interests at the expense of the trust. Such a departure
30 As to treatnent of interlocking-directorate transactions, see generally 1 HoR'-
sTEiN, op. cit. supra note 22, § 439; 2 0LECX, op. cit. supra note 22, § 972; Bayne,
The Fiduciary Duty of Management-The Concept in the Courts, 35 U. DEr. L.J.
561 (1958) ; Note, 51 HAv. L. REv. 327 (1937) ; Note, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 598 (1933).
31 See Bayne, supra note 30, at 575-76; Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 335 (1948).
32 See 2 OLECK, op. cit. supra note 22, § 972; 1 HoRNsTE IN, op. cit. upra note
22, § 439.
33 See Bayne, supra note 30, at 576; Note, 61 HARv. L. REV. 335 (1948); cf.
2 OLECK, op. cit. supra note 22, § 972.
34See 2 OLECK, op. cit. supra note 22, § 972; Bayne, supra note 30, at 576.
35 See HORNSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 22, § 439, at 543; Note, 51 HA v. L. REv.
327, 329-30 (1937).
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erodes, without apparent justification, the fiduciary duty owing to each
institution.
Discretion
In determining the relative weight to be given the competing interests
of trust and corporation in the exercise of fiduciary discretion, it is neces-
sary to consider how the courts have treated the relationship between the
two institutions in light of testamentary intent. Two possible views of this
relationship were expounded in the surrogate and appellate division deci-
sions in In the Matter of Estate of Doelger.
36 In that case, the testator
ordered the incorporation of his business,3 7 and pursuant to his direction
certain restrictions on corporate actions were written into the bylaws.
3 8
The executors elected themselves directors; 39 thereafter, the corporate
shares were to be placed in several trusts, with the executors as trustees
4
At the time of the suit, only fifty per cent of the shares were still held by
the trustees,41 the balance having passed out of trust to remaindermen. A
portion of these shares had come into the hands of strangers to the trust
arrangement.42 The trustee-directors had invested corporate funds in
securities which the trustees, as such, would not have been permitted to
hold.43 The restrictions in the corporate bylaws did not deal with the
investment powers in issue. It was the theory of the surrogate that the fact
of incorporation under direction of the will subjected the corporation's
operations to the limitations of trust law when there was no express au-
thorization to the contrary.4 Thus, while the testator might have granted
full corporate investment powers, his failure to do so left the fiduciary in-
hibited by the restrictive trust rules in the investment of corporate funds,
45
even "when strangers to the trust come in as stockholders . . . ," 46
The surrogate court's view of the applicability of trust law seems to be
shared by other courts-especially when the trust is the sole shareholder.
47
36 164 Misc. 590, 299 N.Y. Supp. 565 (Surr. Ct. 1937), rev'd, 254 App. Div. 178,
4 N.Y.S.2d 334, aff'd mem., 279 N.Y. 646, 18 N.E.2d 42 (1938).
37 254 App. Div. at 180-81, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 336-37.
a381d. at 180-81, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
39 Ibd.
40 Id. at 180, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
41 Id. at 182, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
42 164 Misc. at 598, 299 N.Y. Supp. at 574.
43 254 App. Div. at 182, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
44 164 Misc. at 599, 299 N.Y. Supp. at 575.
45Id. at 601-02, 299 N.Y. Supp. at 578. Most states have statutes controlling
trust investment. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 682.23 (1950), as amended, § 682.23(15)
(Supp. 1960); Ky. Rzv. STAT. §386.020(1) (1956); Wis. STAT. ANN. §320.01
(Supp. 1960). See generally 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 227-231.4 (2d ed. 1956).
46 164 Misc. at 601, 299 N.Y. Supp. at 577.
47 See In re Trust Under Will of Koffend, 218 Minn. 206, 15 N.W.2d 590 (1944);
In the Matter of Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888 (1951) ; In the Matter of
Shehan, 285 App. Div. 785, 141 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1955); Weston v. Weston, 210 S.C. 1,
41 S.E.2d 372 (1947) ; In re Teasdale's Estate, 261 Wis. 248, 52 N.W.2d 366 (1952).
But see Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N.E. 647 (1930); Boyle v. John Boyle
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The appellate division took a directly opposed view.48 It held that,
while express restrictions on the power of the corporation might be required
by will,49 in the absence of such a direction the limitations applicable to a
trust corporation are those implied by corporate law, not trust law:
A clear distinction must be made between the powers and limita-
tions of a corporation formed pursuant to directions in the will and
the powers and limitations of a trustee appointed under the will. The
testator designates his trustee and has power to give the trustee
absolute and unlimited discretion in investments. As the testator has
such power, if he does not use it and says nothing about the trustee's
right to invest, the law limits the trustee to what are designated as
legal investments. But the testator cannot either create, or confer
powers on, a corporation. The sovereign alone has such power. And
when on the executor's petition it creates a corporation, the state and
not the testator gives the corporation all the powers it possesses, in-
cluding the powers of investment that are usual, legal, and customary
in such corporation. As the testator can give no power to the cor-
poration, his silence does not keep from it any the law confers. In the
case of the trustee, since the testator has the power to give discre-
tionary authority in investments, silence means limitation. In the
case of the corporation, since the testator has no such power, silence
means the absence of limitation.50
The reasoning of the court may be slightly unrealistic in that the testator's
power over the trustee is dependent upon state law no less than is the power
over a corporation. But as an expression of the essential difference in
socio-economic function which the two institutions perform, the analysis of
the appellate division is sound. The trust has been traditionally considered
a useful device for preservation and conservation of property for the benefit
of objects of the settlor's bounty.51 It is no less clear that the corporate
form is appropriate for the risk employment of capital iri commercial situa-
tions. For a court to hold as did the surrogate is to preclude utilization
of a device which is suitable for settlors who desire that their funds be
put to more dynamic use than that offered by the stolidity inherent in the
traditional trust. The appellate division recognized this need and by the
use of the convenient touchstone of "testator's intent" 52 incorporated such
& Co., 136 App. Div. 367, 120 N.Y. Supp. 1048 (1910), aff'd iere., 200 N.Y. 597,
94 N.E. 1092 (1911); In re Edwards' Will, 102 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Surr. Ct. 1950),
aff'd nwm., 279 App. Div. 841, 109 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1952); Goetz's Estate (No. 1),
236 Pa. 630, 85 AtI. 65 (1912).
48254 App. Div. 178, 4 N.Y.S.2d 334, aff'd mere., 279 N.Y. 646, 18 N.E.2d 42
(1938).
49 Id. at 184, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
so Id. at 183-84, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40.
51 Cf. 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 582 (1946); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND),
TRUSTS § 176 (1959) ; 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 176 (2d ed. 1956).
52 See In the Matter of Estate of Doelger, 254 App. Div. 178, 183, 4 N.Y.S.2d
334, 339, aff'd per curiam, 279 N.Y. 646, 18 N.E.2d 42 (1938).
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a device into the law of New York. But one wonders about the use of this
phrase as the sole basis for decision. As long as the corporate bylaws
explicitly express the testator's intention to restrict the action of the direc-
tors, there can be no objection to the restrictions so imposed, and the limited
ground of decision is satisfactory.53 However, restrictions on action which
do not appear in the bylaws work silently against the interests of creditors
and other stockholders, and it would be appropriate for a court to inquire
into their effect upon these interests as well.
The New Jersey Superior Court did so in Rosencrans v. Fry,54 which
presented, inter alia, the question of the power of the trustee to withhold
dividends when he is acting as director of the corporation. 55 The dogma
of "testator's intent" was used in reaching the result,56 but the court went
significantly further and considered independent interests.57 The duty of
the trustee to vote shares in such a way as to promote the interests of the
beneficiaries was recognized,58 but the court stated that this obligation
does not embrace a duty to advance the interests of a beneficiary at the
expense of the corporation and other outstanding stockholders' inter-
ests. That duty must be adjusted with the duty of a director as such.
And where, as here, better than 50% of the shares are held by others,
and the policy of the board [of directors] is unassailable from the
standpoint of the company's interests . . . [the trustee] cannot be
said to have been remiss in his duty as co-trustee.59
53 Professor Cahn has suggested a chronological distinction in remedies available
to independent shareholders. Thus, the power to force corporate dissolution or require
the retirement of his stock might be available if the interest were held prior to the
testator's placing the corporation in trust. A subsequent investor, however, is pro-
vided no means of escape from the "corporation," although it is suggested that his
vendor had a duty to disclose the nature of the situation and presumably may be
held liable for his failure to do so. Calm, supra note 6, at 145. By this scheme the
subsequent investor is given no choice at all; and the alternatives available to the
prior investor are not meaningful. Submission to the trust is to participate in a
corporation in name only, see text accompanying and following notes 76-79 infra.
Dissolution destroys the testamentary scheme as well as the investment of the third
party, and forced repurchase by the corporation may well contravene corporate law
by requiring a distribution of capital permanently dedicated to the business when no
retained earnings are available for the purpose. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-251 (1)
(1960) (director liable for knowingly assenting to distributions to shareholders
which impair capital) ; cf. text accompanying notes 80-81 infra. The only choice in
which such an investor would be interested-to retain his position in a vital organi-
zation-is omitted.
5421 N.J. Super. 289, 91 A.2d 162 (Ch. 1952), aff'd, 12 N.J. 88, 95 A.2d 905
(1953).
55 The need for examination into the propriety of performance of the trustee as
a director from the corporate viewpoint was recognized; the court was clearly aware
that his dual position might lead to divergent obligations. 21 N.J. Super. at 296,
297, 91 A.2d at 165, 166. The court expressly confined its discussion on this point
to the duties of the trustee in regard to the corporation and admitted that it could
not, in the case before it, adjudicate the rights of shareholders against the corporation.
Ibid.
56 See id. at 297, 91 A.2d at 166.
57 Id. at 301, 91 A.2d at 168.
58 Id. at 300-01, 91 A.2d at 167-68.
59 Id. at 301, 91 A.2d at 168.
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The adjustment in New Jersey, when the trustee acts within the scope
of his greater discretion as director, would seem to favor the corporate
rather than the trust law-a preference deriving from an awareness and
recognition of the competing policy interests, as well as an inquiry into
the "testator's intent."
THE UNDERLYING CONFLICT
At the core of the problem of resolving the fiduciary conflict
is the functional contrast between the two institutions involved. The
corporation is the most important economic institution in modern capitalistic
society. 60 It is the major conduit through which the flow of risk capital is
directed to appropriate areas of the economy. To perform its functions of
control of capital and labor so as to participate effectively in the proper
allocation of these resources, a wide range of discretion must be vested in
the directorate.61 The necessary discretion is obviously frustrated when
the choice of various alternatives is circumscribed by rules unassociated
with commercial reality.
The trust is also a device for control of capital. But this institution
has developed much as the antithesis of risk capital employment; it is
designed to conserve and protect assets. The legal duties which have
evolved in this area further this conservative purpose and, to some extent,
cannot be varied even by the settlor.62 Some discretion is permitted if not
required,63 but its scope is severely narrowed by operation of law.64 For
instance, in terms of fiduciary freedom in the utilization of funds, the trust
is distinctly and deliberately far less flexible than the corporation. 5
When these two contrasting structures are merged in a trust corpora-
tion, the courts are faced with the choice of applying trust law 66 or cor-
porate law 67 or some newly developed body of law to the activities of the
director-trustee. It must be considered who is served by the use of each
rule.
60 See MASON, THE CORPoRATIoN IN MODERN SocIETY 1 (1960).
61 Ibid. Cf. Note, 61 HARV. L. REv. 335, 336-37 (1948): "Not only did the
obvious legal differences in the position of a trustee and a director make it inapt
[to identify the director's role as that of a trustee], but the director's practical need
for a greater freedom of initiative made the trustee's straight-jacket a troublesome
restraint."
62 See 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 185A, 186 (2d ed. 1956).
6 Id. § 187.
64 Ibid.
65 Cf. 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 17, at 101-02 (1946), where the author in-
dicates the relative flexibility of trust and contract. But cf. Scott, Deviation From the
Terms of a Trust, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1025, 1026 (1931) : "The trust is one of the
most flexible juridical devices in our legal system." Scott is there speaking of the
device as one which the settlor may, within limits, employ "for such purposes and
subject to such provisions as the settlor may choose." Ibid. The text is addressed
to a different level of trust employment: the exercise of discretion by the trustee.
Scotts remarks do not go to flexibility in that aspect. To the same effect as Scott is
Isaacs, Trusteeship in Mode"; Business, 42 HARV. L. REv. 1048, 1052-54 (1929).
66 See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
6 7 See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
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Application of Trust Law
The application of trust rules is premised on the theory that the cor-
poration is to be operated in the best interests of the trust.es This interest
is closely identified with that of the life tenant as opposed to the remainder-
man, since the former is considered the primary object of the settlor's
bounty.69 Thus, power of investment may be curtailed,70 use of deprecia-
tion may be disallowed, 71 retention of earnings for expansion may be
denied, 72 and various other restrictions upon directorial discretion may be
imposed. 73 In the simple trust situation, free of corporate complexities,
the testator's intentions are of utmost importance.74 But where the corpus
includes shares enabling the trustee to exercise corporate control, the in-
hibition of directorial discretion will not merely prefer life tenant over
remainderman, but will subordinate as well the interests of independent
shareholders and creditors of the corporation.
If the trustee-director exceeds the powers conferred upon him as
director, the independent parties adversely affected will most probably have
a remedy.75 A more subtle infringement of independent rights occurs when
trust restrictions narrow the otherwise allowable range of corporate
action.76 Instead of transgressing his corporate authority, the director
is effectively precluded from exercising the full scope of that authority
inasmuch as trust restrictions carry with them trust remedies for their
breach. Under corporate law, the maximum sanction facing a director
for unpopular action within the scope of permissible discretion is removal.
77
68 See In re Trust Under Will of Koffend, 218 Minn. 206, 15 N.W.2d 590 (1944) ;
Erickson v. Starling, 233 N.C. 539, 542, 64 S.E.2d 832, 834-35 (1951) (dictum);
Weston v. Weston, 210 S.C. 1, 17, 41 S.E.2d 372, 379 (1947) (dictum).
09 Cf. McCracken v. Gulick, 92 N.J. Eq. 214, 112 Atl. 317 (Ct Err. & App.
1920); In re Knox's Estate, 328 Pa. 177, 195 At. 28 (1937); Chapin v. Collard,
29 Wash. 2d 788, 189 P.2d 642 (1948).
70 See, e.g., In the Matter of Estate of Doelger, 164 Misc. 590, 299 N.Y. Supp.
565 (Surr. Ct. 1937), rev'd, 254 App. Div. 178, 4 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1938), aff'd per
curam, 279 N.Y. 646, 18 N.E.2d 42 (1938); cf. It re Wacht's Estate, 32 N.Y.S.2d
871 (Surr. Ct 1942).
71 See, e.g., In the Matter of Estate of Adler, 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y. Supp.
542 (Surr. Ct 1937).
72 See, e.g., In re Trust Under Will of Koffend, 218 Minn. 206, 15 N.W.2d 590
(1944) ; cf. In the Matter of Shehan, 285 App. Div. 785, 141 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1955).
73 See, e.g., In the Matter of Horowitz, 297 N.Y. 252, 78 N.E.2d 598 (1948);
In the Matter of Estate of McLaughlin, 164 Misc. 539, 299 N.Y. Supp. 559 (Surr.
Ct. 1937).
74 See Upman v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, 284, 140 N.W. 5, 8 (1913); 1 ScoTT,
TRUSTS §4 (2d ed. 1956); 2 id. §§ 164, 164.1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§§ 4, 164 (1959) ; Isaacs, supra note 65, at 1052; cf. 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 167.1-.2 (2d
ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 167 (1959).
75 See 3 OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW § 1594, at 666 (1959). See generally
2 id. §§ 840-43; 3 id. §§ 1589-602.
76 See Calm, Estate Corporations, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 136, 145 (1937). See also
2 OLECx, op. cit. supra note 75, § 960.
77 Some statutes permit removal of a director without cause by the vote of a
specified majority of shareholders at any time during the director's term. See, e.g.,
CAL. CORP. CODE §810; LA. REv. STAT. § 12:34(c) (4) (1950); MIcH. ComP. LAws
§ 450.13.3 (1948). Generally, however, removal without cause must await the end
THE TRUST CORPORATION
However, the application of trust rules may transform this permissible
corporate action into a breach of trust duty and subject the fiduciary to
monetary liability in addition to removal.78 It is doubtful that the trustee-
director will feel free to follow his corporate conscience when faced with
the possibility of surcharge-especially where this possibility hinges upon
the clarification of confusing and seemingly contradictory rules of law."9
In addition, the independent interests in the corporation, reasonably expect-
ing the management to have the full range of power accorded under the
law of corporations, may find themselves relegated to the status of trust
beneficiaries-a position they had no intention of assuming. These re-
straints cannot but injure the corporation competitively. What the courts
have characterized as conservation of trust corpus works in the corporate
context to destroy the vitality of management necessary in the commercial
world. To place the corporation on an economic treadmill is to invite if
not to insure economic disaster for the enterprise; this can work to the
advantage of no one concerned.
In addition to its effect on the nature of the investment, the application
of trust rules in the corporate sphere also has an impact upon the integrity
of the investment and the protection which this invested capital affords
creditors. Corporate law is explicit in providing rules of "stated" or
"legal" capital, by which distribution of the corporate assets to the share-
holders-such as dividends-may not be made beyond the point at which
assets equal liabilities plus stated capital; 0 these rules have sometimes been
referred to, for better or for worse, as the "trust fund doctrine." 81
In the usual case, this excess over liabilities and stated capital repre-
sents current income or earnings retained from previous periods,8 2 and
of the director's term in office. See 2 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 352 (rev.
vol. 1954). Under common law a majority of the stockholders may, without statutory
provision, remove a director for misconduct in office. See 2 OLEcK, op. cit. supra
note 75, § 990.
78 See 2 SCOTT, TRuSTS § 187.1 (2d ed. 1956).
79 In New York, for example, compare Boyle v. John Boyle & Co., 136 App.
Div. 367, 120 N.Y. Supp. 1048 (1910), aff'd per curiam, 200 N.Y. 597, 94 N.E. 1092
(1911), and In the Matter of Estate of Doelger, 254 App. Div. 178, 4 N.Y.S.2d 334,
aff'd per curiam, 279 N.Y. 646, 18 N.E.Zd 42 (1938), and In re Edwards Will, 102
N.Y.S.2d 715 (Surr. Ct. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 279 App. Div. 841, 109 N.Y.S.2d
844 (1952), with In the Matter of Estate of McLaughlin, 164 Misc. 539, 299 N.Y.
Supp. 559 (Surr. Ct. 1937), and In the Matter of Estate of Adler, 164 Misc. 544, 299
N.Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1937), and In the Matter of Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 254,
97 N.E.2d 888, 891 (1951) (dictum). Compare In the Matter of Estate of Angell,
268 App. Div. 338, 52 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1944), affd per curiam, 294 N.Y. 923, 63 N.E.2d
117 (1945); In the Matter of Will of Maas, 257 App. Div. 134, 12 N.Y.S.2d 159,
aff'd per curiam, 281 N.Y. 866, 24 N.E.2d 502 (1939).
80 What is considered to be stated capital is determined by the statute of the par-
ticular state. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.17 (1956); OHIO R v. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.30 (Page Supp. 1960); TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT. art. 2.17 (Supp. 1956). See
Ballantine & Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions Upon Dividends Under Mod-
ern Corporation Laws, 23 CALIF. L. Rnv. 229, 232-33 (1935) ; 1 HORNSTEIN, CoRPo-
RATION LAW AND PRAcTIcE" § 463 (1959); 2 OLECK, op. cit. supra note 75, §§ 610,
624-25. See generally id. §§ 606-25.8 1 See Ballantine & Hills, supra note 80, at 230. For an early case in which
the "trust fund doctrine" was applied, see Wood v. Dummer, 30 Fed. Cas. 435 (No.
17944) (C.C.D. Me. 1824).
82 See KARREROCK & SIoNs, INTERmEDIATE ACcoUNTmN 693-94 (3d ed. 1958).
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will be distributable as dividends.83 But if income has in any period been
overstated, that amount paid out in excess of the total income correctly
computed will constitute a reduction of assets below the level of liabilities
plus stated capital and violate the distribution rule.
4
For example, depreciation 8 5 is an expense properly charged against
revenues to determine income; 86 a failure to depreciate appropriate assets
will overstate income and have the indicated result.87 A continuing refusal
to take depreciation is a continuing impairment of capital.88 A continuing
violation of the rules prohibiting such distributions would ultimately result
8
SFINNEY & MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING-INTERMEDIATE 136-37 (5th
ed. 1958). See KARRENEROCK & SIMONS, op. Cit. supra note 82, at 696-97. For
statutory provisions to this effect, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.52 (1956) (divi-
dends from earnings or surplus of assets over liabilities including capital); OHIO
RExv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.32-.33 (Page Supp. 1960) (dividends out of surplus defined
as excess of assets over liabilities plus stated capital). Directors are held liable for
improper distributions. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §25-251(1) (1960) (knowingly
assenting to distributions to shareholders which impair capital).
84 See FINNEY & MILLER, op. cit. supra note 83, at 135, 356; KARRENBROCK &
SIMONS, op. cit. supra note 82, at 696-97.
85 For purposes of this discussion, since the expensing or lack thereof is the only
concern, the form of depredation taken is of no consequence and is not considered.
As contemplated herein, charging the expense against revenues of a single period is
of equal merit, for example, to using a straight-line method-although the former
would not normally be considered within the connotations of the term depredation.
As to the difficulties of defining depredation, see SALIERS, DEPRECIATION PRINCIPLES
AND APLICATIONS 38-41 (3d ed. 1939). See generally FINNEY & MILLER, Op. Cit.
mpra note 83, at 352-77.
S6 Wittenberg v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co., 15 Del. Ch. 147, 133 Atl. 48
(Ch. 1926), aff'd, 15 Del. Ch! 409, 138 AtI. 347 (Sup. Ct 1927) ; Whittaker v. Amwell
Nat'l Bank, 52 N.J. Eq. 400, 29 Atl. 203 (Ch. 1894); see Fitts, The Relation of
Depreciation to the Determination of Surphls and Earnings Available for Dividends,
33 VA. L. Rxv. 581 (1947) ; cf. Propp, Depreciation of Buildings Held in Testamentary
Trusts, 19 N.Y. CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 170 (1949).
87 FINNEY & MILLER, op. cit. supra note 83, at 356: "There is now . . . a
sufficient body of court decisions to establish the fact that the law requires a provision
for depreciation, and that the payment of dividends to the full amount of the surplus,
without a provision for depredation, would constitute an impairment of capital." See
People ex rel. Binghamton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Stevens, 203 N.Y. 7, 22-24,
96 N.E. 114, 118-19 (1911); Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1, 13-14
(1909) (dictum); People ex rel. Jamaica Water Supply Co. v. State Bd. of Tax
Comm'rs, 128 App. Div. 13, 17-18, 112 N.Y. Supp. 392, 395 (1908) (dictum), modi-
fled on other grounds, 196 N.Y. 39, 89 N.E. 581 (1909) ; ASHER, SURVEY OF ACCOUNT-
ING 483-84 (1952) ; KARRENBROCK & SIMONS, op. cit. supra note 82, at 799-800;
cf. Myer, Depreciation and Recovery of Cost, 19 N.Y. CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
303 (1949); Peloubet, Are We Giving Away Our Capital Without Knowing It.,
18 N.Y. CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 440 (1948).
88 It may be noted that while depreciation at cost may prevent impairment in the
accounting sense and thus technically satisfy the rule of stated capital, it will not
prevent an economic impairment of capital in an inflationary economy. "If we are
charging into our costs depreciation on a plant built ten or fifteen years ago on the
basis of its cost at that time, we are understating our costs and overstating our
income on a current basis to the extent of the difference in the depredation on the
present value of the machinery and equipment and depreciation on its cost at the
time of acquisition." Peloubet, supra note 87, at 443. Unfettered corporations may
provide for this aspect of economic erosion by the capitalization of retained earnings.
But retention of earnings is another area in trust corporation law which is not clear;
some courts may not permit retention of earnings, at least for this purpose. See
generally Peloubet, supra note 87; Myer, supra note 87.
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in the complete impairment of capital and an ensuing insolvency in the
bankruptcy sense.8 9
But a large body of trust law indicates that depreciation cannot be
taken.90 Such a practice is considered to be an impermissible conversion
of income into corpus.91 The application of this principle accords with
the usual preference given the life tenant; courts so holding show little con-
cern for the reduction in value of the remainder. Even if it is assumed
that the no-depreciation rule is proper for the noncommercial enterprise,
when the rule is applied to corporate operations there is a direct conflict
with the rule for the preservation of capital. This rule of legal or stated
capital serves to protect the interests of all shareholders and creditors.
9 2
Since the creditors have priority over the claims of the shareholders, the
stated capital represents assets providing protection in addition to the
precise amount necessary to satisfy obligations to creditors. This buffer
is destroyed when the stated capital is impaired by distribution of these
assets to the shareholders as dividends. This impairment by definition
reduces the shareholders' ability to realize their claims against assets shown
on the corporate books. If there are senior classes of shares, their pre-
ferred position may be impaired. In any event, all shareholders, by
accepting the delusive dividends, will be participating in the partial liquida-
tion of their investment.93 Obviously, the use of trust rules emasculates
established corporate doctrine. Not only are independent ownership and
creditor interests injured, but the income-producing capacity of the cor-
poration from the viewpoint of the trust is also reduced. In the commer-
cial area of the corporation, even the life tenant seems ill-served by the
application of trust principles such as the no-depreciation rule.
This last point raises a further question regarding the application of
trust law-the validity of the initial presumption as to the testator's intent.
89 See cases cited note 87 supra.
90 Cases in some jurisdictions hold that no depreciation may be taken unless a
contrary intention of the testator appears. See, e.g., Evans v. Ockershausen, 100
F.2d 695, 708-09 (D.C. Cir. 1938); In re Roth, 139 N.J. Eq. 588, 52 A.2d 811
(Prerogative Ct 1947); Chapin v. Collard, 29 Wash. 2d 788, 189 P.2d 642 (1948).
Commentators, considering the distinction between depletion and depreciation to be
one of degree only, have grouped depreciable with wasting assets and have stated a
different rule: "Unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, if property
held in trust to pay the income to a beneficiary for a designated period and thereafter
to pay the principal to another beneficiary is wasting property, the trustee is under
a duty to the beneficiary who is entitled to the principal, either (a) to make provision
for amortization, or (b) to sell such property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§ 239 (1959); accord, 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 239 (2d ed. 1956). The rule's exception-
based on testator's intent-has resulted in a great number of cases denying the right
to deplete or depreciate. See, e.g., Dexter v. Dexter, 274 Mass. 273, 174 N.E. 493
(1931) ; It re Knox's Estate, 328 Pa. 177, 195 At. 28 (1937) ; Leach v. McCreary,
183 Tenn. 128, 191 S.W.2d 176 (1945). See generally Capron, Reserves Against
the Depreciation of Real Property Held by a Trustee, 12 OHIo ST. L.J. 565 (1951);
Propp, supra note 86, at 170.
91 See In the Matter of Estate of Adler, 164 Misc. 544, 549-57, 299 N.Y. Supp.
542, 554-59 (Surr. Ct 1937).
02 Ballantine & Mills, supra note 80, at 233.
93 FNxEY & MILLER, op. cit. supra note 83, at 135.
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The presumption goes beyond a supposed superior interest in the welfare
of the life tenant and affects the essence of the testamentary scheme when
a trust corporation is involved. A vigorous operation of the trust presump-
tion takes from the testator a convenient device for the operation of a busi-
ness by the estate in a fully risk-taking manner. There is no necessary
inconsistency in a testator's having a primary interest in the welfare of his
life tenant and also being of the opinion that an uninhibited corporation is
the best way to serve that interest. By inhibition the court denies the
testator the right to make that determination and denies the availability
of a tool whereby a business in trust can grow and remain an active enter-
prise. The testator can obtain that desired freedom only by express de-
scription of corporate powers and even then probably could not succeed
completely.
9 4
The application of trust rules, then, substitutes the court's judgment
for that of the directors to the detriment of independent interests, and
constructs a new scheme in place of that expressly chosen by the testator-
thereby precluding the use of a valuable testamentary instrument designed
to avoid the unimaginative rigors of trust administration.
Application of Corporate Law
When corporate rules are applied to the corporation in trust, different
results obtain. The problems of the preceding section are resolved so as
to protect the interests of the shareholders and creditors. In addition, the
remainderman is given a more advantageous position in relation to the life
tenant, inasmuch as the value of the shares of stock held in trust may
increase and be turned over at a higher value at the termination of the
trust. This increment in value may be due to the improved prospects of
the enterprise or may be a direct result of earnings retained by the corpo-
ration for contingencies or expansion. This is not to say that the presump-
tion in favor of the life tenant is to be eliminated. It merely raises an
equally forceful presumption in favor of protecting the independent in-
terests, which may incidentally prefer the remainderman. Such conflict as
exists between these presumptions should be resolved in a manner that
provides maximum protection and minimum injury. It has been shown
that trust law introduces absolutes which cannot but work to the detriment
of all outside interests. Corporate law protects these interests and at the
same time permits the trustee to fulfill his duties within the trust sphere.
For instance, where a trust holds a noncontrolling minority interest in a
corporation, the trustee may be under a duty to sell nonproductive assets.9 5
The same procedure should adequately protect the life tenant in the trust
94 Compare Scott, supra note 65, at 1026: "The trust is one of the most flexible
juridical devices in our legal system. One of its chief advantages is that it can,
within limits, be employed for such purposes and subject to such provisions as the
settlor may choose."




corporation context, if the fiduciary, as controlling director, finds that the
best interests of the corporation require him to limit dividends to a level
which he, as trustee, deems insufficient. In such circumstances, the only
solution which does not involve substantial harm to one or another of the
interests involved is to subordinate the testator's design to have the shares
remain in trust to the presumption preferring the life tenant over the re-
mainderman. It is incumbent upon the testator to indicate clearly the
course to be pursued by the trustee: whether to retain the stock to the
possible detriment of the life tenant, or to sell the stock contrary to the
original testamentary scheme. But if the testator desires to preclude this
choice of evils and to limit the discretion of the fiduciary, as director, in
such a manner as to prefer primarily the life tenant, his intentions should
be reflected in the corporate bylaws so as to give notice of the limitation
to independent interests. 6 Clearly, his failure of precise expression should
not impair the interests of strangers to the testamentary scheme by the
application of trust law to the corporate activities.
The conclusions drawn do not discriminate unduly against the trust
as a controlling shareholder. Elsewhere in the corporate area, cases exist
evidencing due regard for the interests of a minority subject to majority
control. 7 The reasoning of this line of authority provides a principle by
which courts may conveniently apply corporation rules to the trust corpo-
ration with a firm basis in decisional law. These cases hold that majority
stockholders are in a fiduciary relationship to the minority stockholders and
the corporate creditors, when the dominant interest uses its voting power
to exercise actual control over the operations of the corporation.9 8 It is
not the power to elect directors which imposes this duty, 99 but rather the
use of this power in such a way as to control directorial discretion by
making the directors agents of the majority shareholders. 10 As a result
of the doctrine of dominant stockholder, the controlling owner "is held to
the same standard of conduct as are directors . ,101 A duty of
96 See note 53 supra and accompanying and following text.
97 The terms "majority" and "minority" are used herein for convenience. The
considerations are equally applicable to situations in which control is effectuated by
less than a numerical majority of shares. See generally 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRuSTEES
§ 16 (1951); ROHRLICHr, LAW & PRACTICE IN CORPORATE CONTROL 96-110 (1933);
Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 1212, 1222-24 (1958).
9 8 Shareholders: see, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919);
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. New York & N. Ry., 150 N.Y. 410, 44 N.E. 1043
(1896); Hill v. Erwin Mills, Inc., 239 N.C. 437, 80 S.E.2d 358 (1954); cf. Weis-
becker v. Hosiery Patents, Inc., 356 Pa. 244, 51 A.2d 811 (1947). Creditors: see,
e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'z on other grounds, 198 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
909 (1952); Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 208 S.W.2d 344 (1948)
(alternative holding).
99 See RoHRm.rcH, op. cit. supra note 97, at 107; Berle, supra note 97, at 1223.
100 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 (1919); Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. v. New York & N. Ry., 150 N.Y. 410, 44 N.E. 1043 (1896) ; Romu aC,
op. cit. supra note 97, at 107; Berle, stpra note 97, at 1223; cf. Weisbecker v. Hosiery
Patents, Inc., 356 Pa. 244, 51 A.2d 811 (1947), which may serve to indicate the
similarity of treatment of majority shareholders, officers, and directors as fiduciaries.
101 Berle, supra note 97, at 1223.
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loyalty to the corporation is thus placed upon such a stockholder, and
self-dealing transactions will be closely scrutinized, if not prohibited.
10 2
The test generally applied is that of fairness; 103 the burden is on the share-
holder in control to prove that advantage has not been taken of his position
to the detriment of the corporation as a whole.104 From the aspect of
corporate law no reason appears why these rules should not obtain if that
majority is a trust.10 5 A wide use of the rule would not be objectionable to
a fairminded majority and would serve to protect others having an interest
in the corporation.
PRIORITY OF REmEDIES
These substantive determinations have relevance to procedural prob-
lems, which may be seen clearly in the context of intentional wrongdoing
by the trustee-director. The dual fiduciary has distinct duties in two
directions. He is bound to protect the value and prevent the loss of both
the corporate assets and the trust corpus. 0 6 The same act or omission may
constitute a breach of both duties.10 7 Thus, in In the Matter of Audi-
tore,'08 it was held that such conduct by a dual fiduciary gives rise to a
right of action for the injury to the trust as well as a separate right of action
on behalf of the injured corporation for recovery of that taken.
In the corporate action the measure of damages will be the full amount
taken.'10 In an action for the benefit of the trust the loss considered is
the reduction in the value of the shares as a result of the wrongdoing;
102 See cases cited note 98 supra.
103 See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Austrian v. Williams,
103 F. Supp. 64, 75 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 909 (1952) ; Hill v. Erwin Mills, Inc., 239 N.C. 437, 80 S.E.2d
358 (1954) ; ROHRLIcH, op. cit. supra note 97, at 110. In some cases the dominant
shareholder is also a director, and it is not always clear in which capacity the fidu-
ciary duty is imposed, see Booth v. Land Filling & Improvement Co., 68 N.J. Eq.
536, 59 Atl. 767 (Ch. 1905); Weisbecker v. Hosiery Patents, Inc., 356 Pa. 244,
51 A.2d 811 (1947).
104 See Pepper v. Litton, supra note 103; Austrian v. Williams, supra note 103;
Hill v. Erwin Mills, Inc., supra note 103; RonRLIcH, op. cit. supra note 97, at 110;
cf. Ross v. Quinnesec Iron Mining Co., 227 Fed. 337 (6th Cir. 1915) ; Booth v. Land
Filling & Improvement Co., supra note 103.
10 5 But cf. 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 193.2, at 1462 (2d ed. 1956) : "There is no rule of
public policy which precludes the owner of a majority of the shares of a corporation
from creating a trust of the shares and requiring the trustee to retain the shares,
thereby giving the trustee the power to control the election of directors and the
ultimate control over the affairs of the corporation."
106 See 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 582 (1946); 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 176
(2d ed. 1956); cf. 3 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRPoRATioNS §§ 838, 849 (perm. ed. rev.
repl. 1947).
107 See In the Matter of Auditore, 249 N.Y. 335, 164 N.E. 242 (1928) ; General
Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 N.Y. 18, 109 N.E. 96 (1915); In the Matter of Estate
of Greenberg, 149 Misc. 275, 267 N.Y. Supp. 384 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
108249 N.Y. 335, 164 N.E. 242 (1928).
109 See Bowers v. Male, 186 N.Y. 28, 78 N.E. 577 (1906) ; Corey v. Independent
Ice Co., 226 Mass. 391, 393, 115 N.E. 488, 489 (1917) (dictum); 3 FLETCHER,
op. cit. supra note 106, § 1102; cf. Lake Harriet State Bank v. Venie, 138 Minn. 339,




this loss will be measured by the share of the corporate loss proportionate
to the trust's holdings. 10 The corporate loss considered in the trust action
is that part of the property taken which is not recoverable by the corpora-
tion.111 It does not appear that the trust must await the outcome of the
corporate action ii--the value of the corporation's right may be treated
as a question of fact in the trust action." 3 The recovery by either trust or
corporation will not affect the other's right of action and in theory will not
affect the measure of damages.'14 A clear distinction in effect obtains in
that recovery by the corporation works to the benefit of all the beneficial
owners thereof including the trust, while recovery by the trust obtains for
its beneficiaries alone. It does not aid the other shareholders or the
creditors that'the trust recovers, and in certain cases such a recovery may
result in their injury, depending upon the financial responsibility of the
trustee-director and the order in which the actions are brought.
If the fiduciary has assets sufficient to meet the claims of the corpo-
ration, then the independent interests should not be injured regardless of
the order of suit. If the corporation sues first, recovery will be complete.
If the trust sues first, recovery theoretically should be nominal, leaving the
wrongdoer capable of fully repaying the corporation. If the fiduciary is
totally without funds, order of judgment is likewise immaterial to the
independent interests. They can expect no recovery from such a debtor,
and the fact that the trust may benefit by recovery from a surety of the
trustee as such will work no harm to their interests." 5
When the wrongdoer has assets which are insufficient to meet fully
the obligation to the corporation, the order of action assumes critical sig-
nificance. At present, the right of first recovery to some extent turns on
the results of a race to the courthouse door. If the corporation wins the
first judgment, all interests will be proportionately protected; the corporate
recovery will be as complete as possible under the circumstances. Non-
trust rights are again in no way injured if the trust can make an additional
recovery from a surety of the trustee. However, if the trust is permitted
110 See In the Matter of Auditore, 249 N.Y. 335, 342, 164 N.E. 242, 243 (1928) ;
In the Matter of Estate of Greenberg, 149 Misc. 275, 277, 267 N.Y. Supp. 384, 387
(Surr. Ct 1933); In the Matter of Estate of Gerbereux, 148 Misc. 461, 473, 266
N.Y. Supp. 134, 148 (Surr. Ct. 1933); cf. General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 N.Y.
18, 21, 25, 109 N.E. 96, 97, 98 (1915).
Ml1 Cf. id. at 24-25, 109 N.E. at 98 (1915). The court in Auditore points out
that if the liabilities of the corporation exceeded the assets, no harm would have
been done the estate by a subsequent wrongdoing-the value of the shares could not
be reduced below zero. In the Matter of Auditore, 249 N.Y. 335, 342, 164 N.E. 242,
245 (1928).
112 Cf. General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 N.Y. 18, 109 N.E. 96 (1915).
"13 See In the Matter of Auditore, 249 N.Y. 335, 344, 164 N.E. 242, 245 (1928);
cf. General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, mtpra note 112.
l14 In an analogous context the "menace of a double liability" has been said to
be illusory. Cardozo, J., spealing for the court in General Rubber Co. v. Benedict,
215 N.Y. 18, 26, 109 N.E. 96, 99 (1915). But see Note, 57 MicH. L. Rxv. 738, 741-42
(1959).
"15 Such was the case in In the Matter of Auditore, 249 N.Y. 335, 164 N.E.
242 (1928).
1961]
730 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.109:713
the initial recovery, the results are significantly different. In such event
any recovery by the trust against the wrongdoer will further impair the
wrongdoer's ability to make restitution to the corporation.
If the trust is the first to sue, the valuation of the damage to the trust
must rest upon a circular analysis since its recovery depends upon the in-
jury to the trust as a result of the corporation's inability to recover, and
the corporate recovery in turn will depend on the recovery allowed the
trust. The circle is inevitable in this situation since any recovery by the
trust will reduce the corporate power of recovery. For present purposes,
the significant aspect is the result that any impairment of corporate recovery
in this manner will benefit the trust at the expense of the independent share-
holders and creditors; and, unlike the trust, the independent shareholders
do not have an action available against the wrongdoer to protect their
private interests as distinguished from the corporate interests." 6 Such an
excessive recovery discriminates in favor of the trust in a manner which
cannot be reconciled with the spirit of the corporate rule placing controlling
shareholders in a fiduciary relationship to other interests.
117
This discussion does not demonstrate a fallacy in the theories of re-
covery but indicates a need for refinement in their use. It is not denied
that there is need for protection of the trust interests, but these interests
should be relegated to their proper sphere. Sound policy dictates that the
application of the rules should recognize the interests of others when the
trust has invaded the corporate field. The corporation should be permitted
to sue first in order to protect these other interests. At some time subse-
quent to the corporate judgment, the amount of recovery to which the trust
is independently entitled will be established, and the trust may thereafter
proceed to judgment if it is advantageous to do so.
CONCLUSION
The "standard of conservatism and prudence," by which the powers
of the dual fiduciary were measured in 1937, has been challenged in the
intervening years by decisions which have measured his duties in terms of
corporate law. But as long as cases following the old rule persist, the
course of action to be followed by the trustee-director will be uncertain.
In working to eliminate this confusion, the courts should seek to achieve
a balance of the various conflicting interests which appear in the trust
corporation. To do so, it is essential that the trust be considered as having
rights equal to those of any other shareholder similarly situated and that
the outer limits of strict trustee duty be drawn at the threshhold of corpo-
rate fiduciary responsibility. Beyond these limits, trust law should bow,
116 See Tomlinson v. Bricklayers' Union, 87 Ind. 308 (1882); Wells v. Dane,
101 Me. 67, 63 Atl. 324 (1905); Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371 (1847);
Niles v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 176 N.Y. 119, 68 N.E. 142 (1903) ; Beeber v.
Wilson, 285 Pa. 312, 131 Atl. 854 (1926) ; Comment, 38 YAL.E L.. 965 (1929).
117 See notes 97-104 supra and accompanying text.
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except in those rare instances in which its application will not infringe on
independent rights.
The application of such a principle to areas considered in this Note
produces the following rules:
(1) when a trustee-director is acting in the dual fiduciary role,
the normal concomitants of a corporate directorship shall be the
standard by which a trustee's actions are measured for purposes of
ascertaining liability for breach of trust in operating the corporation;
(2) transactions between the two institutions, directly involving a
conflict of the interests of trust and corporation, are to be resolved by
placing the burden of proving fairness to the other party on the in-
stitution wishing to take advantage of the transaction;
(3) at any time where rights exist in both the trust and the
corporation whereby independent interests in the corporation may
suffer by prior exercise of the trust rights, the corporate rights are to
be accorded procedural precedence.
R.E.N.
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